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The Kochs, who operate through their own aptly named Americans for
Prosperity, a dark money group their network of super-rich allies also contribute to,
have said that they plan to spend a humongous $889 million in the 2016 campaign—
all of it dark money, so the public won’t know who made the contributions. This
makes the Kochs virtually a political party of their own. 1
INTRODUCTION
Professor Lawrence Lessig has made a great contribution to American public life
by drawing attention to the influence of money in politics through his writing,
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This Article is an expansion and
developments of remarks given on a symposium panel sponsored by the Cleveland State Law
Review on Friday, April 17, 2015, entitled “Power of the Purse: The Influence of Money in
Today’s Political Regime.” That symposium preceded a keynote address by Professor
Lawrence Lessig on the topic, “How Money (in politics) Matters.” This Article also in part
responds to Professor Lessig’s talk. The Article was prepared with the support of the
Duquesne Law School Summer Research Writing Program.
1

Elizabeth Drew, How Money Runs Our Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jun/04/how-money-runs-our-politics.
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speaking, and organizing. His best-selling book, Republic Lost,2 has galvanized a
movement demanding serious campaign finance reform. I agree with the broad
outline of his concern about the dependence of Congress on wealthy individuals and
entities and the political corruption that this pecuniary dependence entails.
So, it is with hesitation that I set out in this Article my reservations concerning
Professor Lessig’s analysis of the problem of money. Money does not play quite the
dominant role in our politics that he suggests. Money by itself does not select
nominees or elect candidates or enact policy.
Moreover, Professor Lessig’s analysis overlooks the unique threat that
independent political spending poses to American democracy. It is independent
spending, rather than money in general, that threatens to undermine the nature of
elections. Independent spending takes away debates and decisions from candidates
and voters and empowers organizations that are, because of non-coordination
requirements, independent and politically irresponsible. To deal with this immediate
threat, I propose the elimination of all contribution limits to candidates for office,
which would greatly inhibit independent spending. The Article opens in Part I with
the legal history and current status of independent political spending. Then, in Part
II, the Article shows how independent spending threatens democracy more
fundamentally than does the influence of money in general. Part III outlines my plan
to limit independent spending, which consists of the simple expedient of eliminating
campaign contribution limits and addresses some of the concerns that arise from the
resulting regime of unlimited direct campaign contributions. Finally, in Part IV, I
return to Professor Lessig’s program of campaign finance reform and suggest that
eliminating contribution limits would actually advance that program.
I consider this Article to be a mostly friendly amendment to the Lessig reform
agenda. Nevertheless, that reform agenda is too diffuse. Without immediate attention
to the specific threat of independent political spending, American democracy will
continue to erode, whatever other reforms are enacted.
I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL SPENDING
The term independent political spending refers to money spent in support of the
election of a candidate for political office that, by law, cannot be coordinated with
the campaign activities organized by that candidate.3 Such spending can be
positive—that is, touting the attributes of a candidate or getting out the vote on her
2

LAWRENCE LESSIG,
TO STOP IT (2011).

REPUBLIC LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND

A

PLAN

3 I use the terms independent political spending and independent spending
interchangeably. There are currently two major forms of independent spending: Super PACs,
a new type of PAC created after Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc), was decided, technically independent expenditure-only committees, and 501(c)(4) and
501(c)(6) organizations, called politically active nonprofit organizations. See Political
Nonprofits
(Dark
Money),
OPENSECRETS.ORG,,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2016);
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG,, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last
visited Jan. 25, 2016). Money spent on behalf of ballot questions and other forms of political
decision-making is beyond the scope of this Article, but is generally protected from
government regulation. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
298-99 (1981) (striking down contribution limits to a referendum campaign as far removed
from the potential for candidate corruption).
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behalf—but is often negative, attacking a favored candidate’s opponents. Disclosing
the sources of independent spending may or may not be required.4 When the sources
of independent spending are not disclosed, the spending is often called “dark
money.”5 While individuals can engage in independent spending on their own, the
vast majority of such spending is undertaken by nonprofit organizations, often
created to further the electoral prospects of a single candidate, usually in one election
cycle. Organizations engaged in independent spending can receive unlimited
donations from corporations, individuals, and unions.6
Independent political spending did not exist in any important sense before 1976.
Prior to that, candidates and political parties controlled spending in American
political campaigns.7 Independent political spending arose because of the particular
holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.8
A. The Supreme Court’s Role in Independent Political Spending
Buckley held that, under the First Amendment, the only government interest that
could justify restrictions on political contributions or political spending was
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.9 The Court held that there
was no compelling government interest in reducing the influence of wealth by
leveling the playing field to equalize the influence of individuals and groups.10 In
practical terms, these holdings meant that government could, to an extent, regulate
contributions to candidates, but could not regulate spending on behalf of candidates,
whether from a candidate’s personal funds or by individuals independent of a
campaign.
The Buckley framework of limiting contributions but failing to limit independent
spending, survives to this day. The only significant change in defining permissible
campaign finance regulation since Buckley was the holding in Citizens United v.
FEC that corporations enjoy First Amendment protections similar to those of

4 See Bradley A. Smith, Disclosure in a Post-Citizens United Real World, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 268 (2012). For example, Super PACs must report their
donors to the Federal Election Commission on a monthly or quarterly basis, while politically
active nonprofits do not have to disclose the sources of their funding. Of course, there are
loopholes to disclosure, such as nonprofit contributions to Super PACs that can effectively
shield the real sources of funds. Id.
5 See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 3. The Supreme Court held in
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370-71 (2010), that corporations could be required to
disclose their independent political spending, but it is not clear that the law has kept up with
the evolving phenomenon of independent spending.
6

Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), supra note 3.

7 In fact, independent spending did not really take off until the twenty-first century. See
Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. &
POL. 683, 683 (2012).
8

424 U.S. 1 (per curiam).

9

Id. at 25-28.

10

Id. at 48-49.
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individuals, and thus are protected in using general treasury funds to engage in
independent spending on behalf of candidates.11
The modern phenomenon of independent political spending was born at the point
of this juxtaposition of contribution limits without spending limits. A person who
supports the election of a candidate can only contribute a certain amount of money
directly to that candidate.12 Therefore, if that person wants to spend more money
supporting a candidate than contribution limits permit, the only way to do so is to
spend money directly, by, for example, creating advertising supporting the
candidate’s election. Non-coordination regulations, which prohibit coordination
between independent political spending and campaign spending, ensures that
independent spending is not a disguised, prohibited campaign contribution.13
The continuity of the Buckley framework masked a disagreement among the
Justices over the meaning of the corruption that the government might permissibly
seek to prevent. In 2003, in McConnell v. FEC, the Court interpreted the government
interest in preventing corruption to include not just the quid pro quo corruption of
vote buying, but “the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or
the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”14 This expansive
understanding of corruption, which is the understanding of corruption ardently
supported by Professor Lessig,15 could support not only limits on campaign
contributions, but limits on independent spending as well.
In light of the possibility of restricting independent spending, the real
significance of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United was not its
holding regarding corporations, but his quotation from his dissent in McConnell,
rejecting any approach to corruption broader than the prevention of quid pro quo
vote buying.16 Justice Kennedy held expressly for the Court in Citizens United that
quid pro quo vote buying corruption could not justify a restriction on independent
spending because such spending is not coordinated with a candidate’s campaign,
and, therefore, could not yield quid pro quo corruption.17 This narrow conception of
corruption now seems fully entrenched on the Court.18
11

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19, 370-71 (2010).

12

See FED. ELEC. COMM’N, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2015-2015 FEDERAL ELECTIONS,
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
13 The Court in Buckley upheld treating coordinated expenditures as if they were
contributions to a candidate – and thus permitting restrictions on the amount of coordinated
spending – but struck down similar treatment for expenditures “made totally independently of
the candidate and his campaign.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
14

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003).

15

See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 226-47.

16

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
17

Id. at 360.

18

See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42 (2014). At the Cleveland State Law
Review 2015 Symposium, Professor Lessig expressed confidence that Justice Kagan would
lead the Supreme Court toward a new conception of corruption that would permit government
regulation of independent political spending. Professor Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at
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B. The Effect of Constitutionally-Protected Independent Spending on American
Politics
Before the current election cycle, one could point to three effects of independent
spending on American politics: independent spending could (1) mask the sources of
monetary support for a candidate, (2) increase the overall amount of spending on
behalf of that candidate and (3) allow campaign activities, such as negative
advertising, to go forward without the candidate’s accountability. Of these effects,
this Article is mainly concerned with the political irresponsibility that corresponds
with the third effect. It is the independence of independent spending that threatens
democracy in America.
The other two effects have not been significant by themselves. In terms of
masking the sources of independent spending, the media has sometimes ferreted out
such sources, even when attempts have been made at hiding them.19 The real
problem has been getting the public to care. The independence of this spending
shields candidates from paying a political price for their dependence on unpopular
funders.
In terms of the amount of money that independent spending provides, it is not
clear how much of that money would be donated anyway—in the form of
contributions to candidates—if independent spending were ended. There is a lot of
independent spending. For example, in the 2014 Alaska Senate race, the candidates
together spent less than $20 million,20 while outside groups spent around $40
million.21 If, however, the sheer amount of money spent is a concern, that concern is
unrelated to the independence of the spending. Someone worried about the expense
of politics is presumably concerned about the amount, not the form, of the spending,
as demonstrated by the fact that $60 million was spent on the Alaska Senate race in
2014.
In contrast to transparency and overall expense, the ability of independent
spending to shield candidates from responsibility for actions taken on their behalf
has actually changed how political campaigns are run and perhaps even has affected
the Cleveland State Law Review Symposium: Power of the Purse: The Influence of Money in
Today’s Political Regime (Apr. 17, 2015). At the moment, it appears that any such change
will have to await a change in membership on the Court.
19

See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Courts Shine Light on Dark Money, BRENNAN CTR.
JUST. (May 26, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/courts-shine-light-darkmoney. Actually, for purposes of transparency, the specific sources might not even matter. For
example, two important sources of dark money in the North Carolina 2014 legislative races
were the Natural Resources Defense Council and the American Petroleum Institute. See Alex
Kotch, Outside Political Groups Spent $10M in NC in 2014, Favored GOP, INST. FOR
SOUTHERN
STUD.
(Mar.
12,
2015,
11:29
AM),
http://www.southernstudies.org/2015/03/outside-political-groups-spent-10m-in-nc-in-2014f.html. What more could voters learn about the nature of these influences that their very names
do not tell them?

FOR

20 See
Alaska
Senate
Race,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?id=aks1&cycle=2014 (last visited Jan. 25,
2016).
21 See
2014
Outside
Spending,
by
Race,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2014&disp=R&pty=A&type=
A (last visited Dec 9, 2015).
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candidates’ chances for victory. Two celebrated examples illustrate the point. In the
2004 presidential election campaign, a group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth
raised politically damaging questions about the Vietnam War service record of
Democratic candidate John Kerry, who had been emphasizing his military record in
contrast to that of President George Bush.22 In the view of many observers, the
campaign against Kerry was inaccurate, which has given rise to the phrase
“swiftboating” to describe false political attacks on a candidate.23 For purposes of
this Article, the importance of this episode lies in the response to it and the
requirement of non-coordination of independent spending.24 When the swiftboat ads
first appeared, Republican Senator John McCain, himself a veteran of the Vietnam
War, called on the Bush campaign to condemn the ads.25 Instead, the Bush campaign
released a statement that pointed out it was not the Bush campaign that was
challenging Kerry’s military record.26 Kerry was dismissive of this response,
insisting that Bush wanted the Swift Boat group “to do his dirty work.”27 President
Bush was pressed on the issue, but responded with a call for an end to all
independent spending and urged Senator Kerry to do the same.28 It is unclear what
such an agreement about independent spending by the candidates could accomplish,
given the non-coordination requirement.
Without addressing the issues of ties between the Bush campaign and the Swift
Boat group, or the extent of actual, and thus illegal, coordination, it is clear that
without independent spending, the legitimacy of Kerry’s military record would either
not have arisen—the Bush campaign was obviously loathe to raise the issue—or
President Bush would have been forced to defend or condemn the attacks. It was the
independence of the ad campaign that allowed President Bush to benefit from
questionable political tactics on his behalf, for which he could then deny all
responsibility.
22

See Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, 2004 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527events.php?id=61 (last visited Dec 9, 2015).
23 See MELISSA M. SMITH
GAME 105 (2010).

ET AL.,

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE POLITICAL SHELL

24 The group Swift Boat Veterans for Truth was organized under section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which exempts from taxation “issue advocacy” nonprofit
organizations that are also prohibited from coordination with candidates and campaigns. See
Benjamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash: Evaluating the
FEC's New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006).
25

See McCain Deplores Anti-Kerry Ads, NBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2004, 1:51 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5612836/ns/politics/t/mccain-deplores-anti-kerryad/#.Vj0E7LSTr8F.
26

See Bush Urges Immediate End to ‘Soft Money’ Ads, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/aug/5/20040805-115811-6900r/?page=all (“‘We
have not and we will not question Senator Kerry's service in Vietnam,’ White House
spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters aboard Air Force One.”).
27

Jodi Wilgoren, Fed Up, Kerry Says Bush Lets Group ‘Do His Dirty Work,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/us/fed-up-kerry-says-bush-lets-groupdo-his-dirty-work.html.
28 See Larry King Live: Interview with George W. Bush, Laura Bush, CNN (Aug. 12,
2004), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0408/12/lkl.00.html.
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The swift boat lesson from 2004, that independent spending could insulate a
candidate from responsibility for controversial attacks on an opponent, was
dramatically reinforced in the 2012 Republican presidential primary campaign. As
told by Paul Blumenthal at the Huffington Post, the main beneficiary of the
irresponsibility of independent spending was the ultimate winner of the Republican
nomination, Mitt Romney:
A similar notoriety has come to define Restore Our Future, the proRomney super PAC. The group has been nicknamed the "Death Star" by
the media for its emulation of the "Star Wars" movie menace: Instead of
planets, Restore Our Future zeros in on Romney's closest competitors and
eviscerates them with negative ads.
“In state after state, whoever has popped up on the Republican side
has been the recipient of very hard-hitting attacks,” West29 said. “It's not
just the negativity, but a lot of the attacks have been misleading or take
things out of context.”
In December, when Gingrich surged to a huge lead in the national
polls ahead of the Jan. 3 Iowa caucuses, Restore Our Future began an
unprecedented assault. Its ads brought up Gingrich's climate change
efforts with Democrats Nancy Pelosi and Al Gore, his work for Freddie
Mac, the non-lobbying lobbying he did for health care companies and the
$300,000 penalty levied on him for congressional ethics rules violations.
Gingrich collapsed in the polls as the Iowa contest approached.
After Gingrich bested Romney in the South Carolina primary on Jan.
21 and surged again into the national lead, Romney’s super PAC ally
spent $10.9 million across Florida—the biggest negative campaign waged
in one state by an independent group in primary history. Gingrich was
swamped by the negative ads and lost badly in the Sunshine State.30
Although it was always clear that Romney was associated with these efforts, the
ferocity and effectiveness of the negative campaign would not have been possible
had Romney been forced to air these ads himself. It is important to remember that,
given non-coordination requirements, Romney could not have legally stopped or
modified these attack ads even if he had wished to do so.
By the 2012 campaign, independent spending had come to be a shield for a
certain form of questionable attack ads. But the use of independent spending has
been changing since that time. One change has been the entrance of independent
spending into state and local elections, for judges, state legislators, governors and
other state offices.31

29

Darrell West is the Vice President and Director of Governance Studies at the Brookings
Institution.
30 Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Ad Men Have Long History of Republican Attack Politics,
POST
(Mar.
8,
2012,
12:44
PM),
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/super-pac-ads-mitt-romney-ricksantorum_n_1314880.html.
31 See Kotch, supra note 19. In North Carolina, for example, independent spending by
outside groups on legislative races grew from $2.97 million in 2012 to $8.23 million in 2014.
Id.
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The importance of this change is that, as opposed to the typically tight
connections between presidential candidates and the groups that raise and spend
independent money—so that the messages and themes of the independent groups
likely mirror those of the candidate—national independent spending can crowd out
the themes and issues that local candidates wish to emphasize and run on. For
example, if the National Resources Defense Council and the American Petroleum
Institute begin running ads in state legislative races, the pressure will grow on
candidates in those races to address the reality and importance of global warming,
even though the candidates in these races might have little interest in discussing that
issue. If the same money were contributed to the candidates’ campaigns instead, the
election campaign itself would not be taken away from the candidates.
A second change in independent spending that is noticeable in the 2016
presidential campaign is the uses of independent spending are growing. No longer
does such money only run ad campaigns. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton plans to use a Super PAC as a rapid response resource, even coordinating
with the group under the so-called “Internet exemption.”32 The Associated Press
reported in April that Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush plans to turn over
to a Super PAC, “many of the duties typically conducted by a campaign.”33 And, the
New York Times reported in July 2015, that field operations preparing for the Iowa
caucuses were being run by Super PACs rather than by certain campaigns.34 It is not
really known how all this can be done within the restrictions of non-coordination.
III. THE UNIQUE THREAT THAT INDEPENDENT SPENDING POSES TO AMERICAN
POLITICAL LIFE
We come now to the heart of the disagreement between Professor Lessig and me.
From my perspective, the issue that must be addressed is independent political
spending. For Professor Lessig, in contrast, the basic problem of American political
life is that the dependence of candidates for office on campaign contributions from
wealthy donors leads to a system that caters to donors’ interests. Professor Lessig
asserts that this would remain the basic problem even if independent spending were
replaced by direct campaign contributions. According to Professor Lessig, wealthy
individuals and corporations decide who gets to be taken seriously as a candidate and
what issues ultimately get addressed in government decision-making.

32

Matea Gold, How a Super PAC Plans to Coordinate Directly with Hillary Clinton’s
Campaign, WASH. POST (May 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2015/05/12/how-a-super-pac-plans-to-coordinate-directly-with-hillary-clintonscampaign. The Internet exemption refers to “a 2006 Federal Election Commission regulation
that declared that content posted online for free, such as blogs, is off limits from regulation.”
Id.
33 Thomas Beaumont, Jeb Bush Prepares to Give Traditional Campaign a Makeover,
PRESS
(Apr.
21,
2015,
6:19
PM),
ASSOCIATED
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/409837aa09ee405493ad64a94b8c2c3d/bush-preparing-delegatemany-campaign-tasks-super-pac.
34

See Trip Gabriel, ‘Super PACs’ Take on New Role, Organizing Voters, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/politics/super-pacs-take-on-new-roleorganizing-voters.html?_r=0. The campaigns listed were those of Senator Rand Paul of
Kentucky and Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana. Id.
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Despite our differences, I do not deny that politics in America favors the rich,
whether overall, or in terms of the sorts of particular issues that Professor Lessig sets
forth in his book.35 One need only consider the matter of the Reagan cut in marginal
federal income tax rates in 1986. Much of the problem of income inequality in
America could be addressed by simply reversing that tax cut and returning to the tax
rates of the 1950s, which was a golden era for economic growth and for a stable and
widespread American middle class.36 Despite the fact that most people would benefit
from this change, it can be predicted with certainty that reversing the Reagan tax cut
will not be raised as an issue in the coming presidential campaign. Professor Lessig
would no doubt view this as self-evident proof of his position.
The important question to ask, however, is why most political candidates do not
discuss the fundamental issue of income inequality? Professor Lessig would assert
that the reason is structural: in a privatized campaign system, candidates for office
need contributions and those contributions can only come, as a practical matter, from
the tiny portion of the electorate that disproportionately benefit from low tax rates.
While this is so, Professor Lessig’s answer does not tell the whole story. In fact,
the need for wealthy donors is a relatively minor part of the reason that low tax rates
are not generally challenged on the campaign trail. In America, low tax rates are
genuinely popular, and candidates who run on the platform of raising taxes usually
enjoy little electoral support. Whether one treats this phenomenon as a function of
Marxist false consciousness, or prejudice against the poor and people of color, or as
a function of something else—a phenomenon encapsulated in the book What’s the
Matter with Kansas,37 which highlighted the failure of Americans to vote their
apparent material interests—is a political, not a structural, matter. In other words, in
America, candidates for office favor the interests of the wealthy not to get money, or
not only to get money, but to get votes.38 Thus, it is not structure, but politics, that
favors the rich.

35

See LESSIG, supra note 2. Professor Lessig calls these particular issues, such as why we
do not have free markets, “tells.” Id. at 41.
36 This point is made about reversing the parallel tax cuts by Margaret Thatcher in
Anthony B. Atkinson’s recent book, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? (2015). Thomas
Piketty’s review of Atkinson’s book alerted me to this one simple action. See Thomas Piketty,
A Practical Vision of a More Equal Society, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 25, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jun/25/practical-vision-more-equal-society. It
was Piketty who made the point that the same analysis applies to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which cut the upper tax rate in the United States to twenty-eight percent. Id. President Reagan
had previously overseen a reduction in the top marginal tax rate from seventy percent to fifty
percent. See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 180-83 (2015).
Atkinson has a much more radical and innovative plan for change than just raising tax rates.
See id. at 237-39.
37 THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S
HEART OF AMERICA (2004).

THE

MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE

38 On more specialized issues, like banking regulation, which are the sorts of issues that
Professor Lessig highlights in his book, there may be more substance to Professor Lessig’s
analysis. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 80-81. But, those particular issues pale in significance
compared to the real power of money to govern the overall shape of political life. And that
real power is genuinely popular.
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Even considering just the money itself, as Professor Lessig wants to do, does not
remove the money from the politics. While candidates and office holders feel
dependent on money and do respond to its donors, a lot of that money, maybe most
of it, also represents the political commitments of ordinary people, even if the money
is actually donated by rich people. This is certainly true of anti-gun control money,
environmental money, and pro-Israel money. Serving those interests is not just
catering to the source of the funds, but also to the millions of people who agree with
the contributors. This is also true of pro-market, global warming skepticism money,
even if the source of that money is the oil and gas industry. The influence of money
does not trump politics. Money is a part of politics.39
The political aspect of money, which is always present, increases when the
money is contributed to candidates directly, as opposed to being spent
independently. When this money goes to candidates in the form of contributions, the
money remains within traditional political considerations. Its impact there must at
least compete with a candidate’s larger political goals and commitments.40
The interrelationship between money and political influence is basically
overlooked in Professor Lessig’s analysis, which claims that the problem is always
money, plain and simple. A dramatic example of Professor Lessig’s one-sidedness in
this regard, is what he refers to as “Tweedism.” Our system is not democratic,
Professor Lessig argues. Yes, voters cast votes, but money interests decide who gets
to run, in a fashion similar to the Chinese government’s proposal to have a handpicked committee select the candidates for political office in Hong Kong, and
afterwards allow a popular vote to select the office holders. The citizens of Hong
Kong rightly protested against this proposal, but it is in effect our system, claims
Professor Lessig.41

39

I saw the truth of this claim of the interconnection of money and politics illustrated
dramatically in my hometown newspaper, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, on Monday, July 27,
2015. Reporter Rich Lord carefully traced the campaign contributions to Governor Tom
Corbett that helped the natural gas industry stave off a severance tax during the Corbett
administration. Rich Lord, How Pennsylvania Gas Industry Gained Corbett Influence, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE
(July
27,
2015,
12:00
AM),
http://powersource.postgazette.com/news/state/2015/07/27/How-gas-industry-gained-Corbettinfluence/stories/201507270009. But, on that same day, an op-ed by Jim Kunz, a business
manager for a union employed in the natural gas industry, appeared in the paper arguing that a
proposed severance tax would cost Pennsylvania jobs. Jim Kuntz, Don’t Kill Our
Pennsylvania Shale Jobs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (July 27, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/opinion/2015/07/27/Don-t-kill-our-Pennsylvania-shalejobs/stories/201507270019. Obviously, Mr. Kunz was not planning to give money to the
readers of the op-ed, but was trying to convince them of a preferred policy outcome.
40 See J. Robert Abraham, Note, Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance
Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1120-21 (2010) (finding that in a system of direct
contributions, “political money would be channeled to political actors who would still be
constrained in their campaign practices as a result of public disclosure requirements and
ultimate accountability at the ballot box”).
41

See Lawrence Lessig, We Should Be Protesting, Too, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2014,
5:59
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/we-should-be-protestingtoo_b_5917486.html (explaining the Tweedism analogy as deriving from Boss Tweed in New
York City).
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Again, as is the case with the influence of money generally, there is some truth to
Professor Lessig’s claim about candidate selection. Former United States Senator
Jim Webb, who announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for
President on Friday July 2, 2015, decried his inability to raise the huge sums of
money necessary to be taken seriously.42 To the same effect, the ability to raise
enormous sums is certainly a key component to Jeb Bush’s campaign strategy.43
But, one can point conversely to the example of Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker to show that money is secondary to politics. Walker did not begin the
presidential campaign with notable access to big money. It was his grass roots
performance in Iowa that gave him national standing and the access to money that he
later enjoyed.44 Of course, Governor Walker’s anti-union message is congenial to big
money. So, money is not irrelevant. But, that anti-union message is also congenial to
the Republican voters of Iowa, as well as doubtlessly representing Governor
Walker’s own sincere beliefs.45
42 Maggie Haberman & Alan Rappeport, Jim Webb Announces Democratic Bid for
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/politics/jimwebb-presidential-campaign.html. Webb wrote in his announcement on his website, “I
understand the odds, particularly in today’s political climate, where fair debate is so often
drowned out by huge sums of money.” JIM WEBB ‘16, http://www.webb2016.com/jim-webbannounces-candidacy-for-president (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
43 See Anna Palmer & Tarini Parti, Jeb’s Smooth Money Machine, POLITICO (June 15,
2015, 5:11 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/jeb-bush-2016-fundraising-moneycampaign-118950.html#ixzz3g4wOpcYf. (“The full-court press is a key component of his
campaign strategy to shut out potential rivals from megadonors, cement himself as the
Republican establishment candidate and create the most ambitious presidential fundraising
operation in history—all before even announcing his White House bid.”).
44 See Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin, Scott Walker’s Hard Right Turn in Iowa
TIMES
(July
2,
2015),
May
Hurt
Him
Elsewhere,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/politics/scott-walkers-hard-right-turn-in-iowa-mayhurt-him-elsewhere.html?ref=todayspaper. For example, the New York Times described his
rise in July 2015: “Breakout performances on the stump in Iowa early this year vaulted Mr.
Walker, who is expected to officially enter the presidential race this month, into the lead in
polls in the state with the nation’s first nominating contest, and cemented him among the top
three Republican contenders in most national surveys.” Id.
45 See Robert Samuels, Walker’s Anti-Union Law Has Labor Reeling in Wisconsin, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-wisconsin-walkers-antiunion-law-has-crippled-labor-movement/2015/02/22/1eb3ef82-b6f1-11e4-aa051ce812b3fdd2_story.html. Governor Walker's abrupt exit from the presidential race on
September 21, 2015, also shows that money is not the deciding factor in the ongoing
Republican presidential campaign. Governor Walker was undone by the preference of
Republican voters for an outsider. See Steve Peoples & Julie Pace, Ranks Thinning,
Traditional GOP Candidates Try to Adapt, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:22 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/433ce669798c4aec9bc7dce88c5a1ced/ranks-thinning-traditionalgop-candidates-try-adapt. Governor Walker was also undone by his own mistakes. See James
Downie, The One Thing We Know After Scott Walker's Early Exit, WASH. POST (Sept. 21,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/09/22/the-one-thing-weknow-after-scott-walkers-early-exit. His campaign ran out of money only after his political
support began to disappear. In fact, at the time of his withdrawal, the Super PAC supporting
him still “was relatively flush with cash.” Nicholas Confessore, Demise of Scott Walker’s
2016 Bid Shows Limits of ‘Super PACs,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015),
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The same dominance of politics over money is true of Jim Webb’s problem
overcoming Hillary Clinton’s lead in the race for the Democratic nomination for
President, or that of other Democratic candidates, such as Vermont Senator Bernie
Sanders. Certainly, Clinton has more money, and access to even more money in the
future, than does any other Democrat. But, Clinton’s overwhelming lead has much
more to do with her standing with African-Americans, women, and other key
portions of the Democratic Party coalition, than it does with her lead in
fundraising.46
If we go further back in time, the nomination of Barack Obama over Hillary
Clinton in 2008 is another example of political attraction overcoming a lead in
fundraising. Eventually, candidate Obama became a potent fundraiser. His
fundraising success, however, came after he created political support for his
nomination.47 The foregoing demonstrates that Professor Lessig’s Hong Kong
analogy is exaggerated. The rich do not select our candidates. They do have an
outsized influence, but they do not select.
If the influence of money is part of the give and take of the political process,
rather than a structural weakness, then great attention must be paid to the political
responsiveness of our system to that disproportionate influence. In other words, if
issues are addressed in politics primarily because of their popularity, rather than just
because of the influence of money, and if candidates are selected to run because of
their political attractiveness, rather than solely because of their lead in fundraising,
then the influence of money must be addressed in a political, rather than a structural
way.
Again, I do not deny that the wealthy have far too much influence for America to
maintain a healthy democracy. In addition, I do not deny that in detailed decisionmaking, in contexts in which the public has trouble discerning what is going on—as
in bank regulation, for example—public opinion is often ignored in favor of the
interests of wealth. But the way to deal with this phenomenon is to engage the public
in the issue of banking reform, rather than emphasizing public financing of
campaigns.
Independent spending now threatens the political responsiveness of our system
and will do so much more in the future. Historically, the threat of independent
spending has been to remove responsibility from a candidate for actions undertaken
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/us/politics/scott-walkers-demise-shows-limits-of-superpac-money-model.html.
46 See Steve Kornacki, How African-American Votes Could Tip the Scale for Clinton,
MSNBC (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-african-americanvotes-could-tip-the-scale-clinton; Jeffrey M. Jones, Hillary Clinton Retains Strong Appeal to
American Women, GALLUP (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182081/hillaryclinton-retains-strong-appeal-american-women.aspx; see also Shane Goldmacher, Cash Rich
Clinton Towers Over the GOP Field, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:15 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/hillary-clinton-2016-money-race-214868.
47

John Solomon, Obama Takes Lead in Money Raised, WASH. POST (July 2, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/01/AR2007070100381.html.
Clinton outraised Obama during the first quarter of 2007, but Obama surged into the money
raising lead in the second quarter. An indication that this was politics producing money and
not the other way around, is that in that second quarter, “[t]he vast majority of Obama’s
donors gave in relatively small amounts . . . . The average donation was $202 . . . .” Id.
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for the candidate or against an opponent, as independent spending shielded George
Bush and Mitt Romney in the above examples. This makes it difficult for the voters
to judge the character of the candidate, who can plausibly deny that he is acting
improperly, or the record of an opponent, who is being savaged by misleading attack
ads. Even if nothing else were at stake, this effect of political irresponsibility makes
it imperative that we try to eliminate independent spending.
Although independent spending in judicial campaigns is beyond the scope of this
Article, it should also be noted that the Supreme Court opinion that most strongly
suggests, and criticizes, the relationship between spending and improper influence
on judges—and thus the case that might be thought most directly to support
Professor Lessig’s thesis that money per se is the problem—was in fact a case about
independent spending on unfair attack ads to change a judicial election result. In
Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., a party who would later seek to overturn a large
judgment against his company, spent $3 million, not on contributions to the judicial
candidate who would eventually cast the deciding vote in his favor, but in creating
ads that helped defeat a sitting justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.48 Without independent spending, those unfair ads either would never have
run or the ultimately successful judicial candidate would have had to take
responsibility for them, which might have cost him the election. Caperton thus
illustrates not the influence of money in general, but the disastrous effect of
irresponsible independent spending.
But there is more to the threat from independent spending than just political
irresponsibility. Independent spending is now poised to take over whole campaigns
from the candidates in those elections. Independent spending now threatens the
autonomy of political campaigns. This is an even more fundamental threat to
American political life than irresponsibility.
To see this threat, consider the role an American election plays in public life.
Because of the American emphasis on the two-party system, American elections
have represented an opportunity for voters to make a choice between two visions of
the future, either in terms of a particular issue or in more general terms. The iconic
model for this understanding of American politics is the series of debates in 1858
between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas, the two Senate candidates from
Illinois, over the future of slavery (although at the time the Illinois state legislature
voted on and selected the state’s senators).49
Despite all the problems of American political life today—its outlandish hatreds
and partisan deadlocks—this model of decision between two visions of the future
has given our system a great deal of dynamism. It has allowed an actual public
decision to be made in an election, at least in general terms.50
As independent spending evolves into political parties of its own,51 election
campaigns could become merely occasions for ongoing debates over issues deemed
48

556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).

49

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES (Rodney O’ Davis & Douglas L. Wilson, eds., 2008).

50 Clearly, the American political system does not always—and never completely—live up
to this ideal of the two party system, but pretty dramatic popular turns have occurred with
some regularity—for example, the elections of FDR, Ronald Reagan and, for a time, Barack
Obama. For a contrast between the ideal and the actual, see Joel Rogers, Two Party System:
Pull the Plug, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 743 (2000).
51

See Drew, supra note 1.
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important by organized interests, on the left and right. Candidates themselves could
become a sideshow to the main event of special interest campaigning. In this way,
independent spending could sever the bond between candidate and voter.
This is not a theoretical concern. The New York Times reported in July 2015 that
field operations preparing for the Iowa caucuses were being run by Super PACs
rather than by the presidential candidates.52 Since these PACs are closely identified
with the candidates, this is undoubtedly not an instance of genuinely independent
operations, but probably one in which non-coordination rules are being flouted.
Nevertheless, there can be no obvious coordination between the Super PAC and the
campaign. This led the New York Times reporter to make this ominous observation:
“[T]here are risks to outsourcing a field campaign. Candidates, who are legally
forbidden to coordinate with super PACs, are in danger of being cut off from their
most ardent supporters as they head into caucus and primary elections.”53 What kind
of democracy can there be when candidates are legally prohibited from direct contact
with supporters? This already is the strange new world of independent spending.
America has not yet experienced a national campaign truly based on independent
spending—one in which, for example, the National Resources Defense Council and
the American Petroleum Institute begin running ads about the reality of global
warming in state legislative races when the candidates themselves have little interest
in discussing the issue. The Super PACs in Iowa are close to the campaigns they are
serving as proxies. But as the interests that spend independently become better
organized, more sophisticated, and begin to maintain continuing, institutional
spending structures, it seems that a kind of parallel campaign is likely to evolve.
One could argue that this kind of private outsourcing of the themes of a political
campaign would improve democracy by forcing candidates to address important
issues that both major party candidates would prefer to push under the rug. But, for
better or worse, American political life has left the selection of issues largely to
candidates in individual races. America does not even practice the political party
selection of issues that parliamentary systems favor. Independent spending threatens
to change the American approach to political elections and we should certainly think
hard before continuing policies that favor the independent spending that is bringing
this about.
As the above discussion shows, there are two different types of independent
spending. The first, which is what independent spending has been up until this time,
is the spending in which non-coordination is a fiction. These are, for example, the
Super PACs organized by candidates themselves. In effect, this money substitutes
for direct contributions that would violate contribution limits, and allows that money
to fund questionable campaign activities or even, as in Iowa, to more easily fund
genuine campaign activities. This kind of “independent” activity is harmful, but
perhaps not fatal, to democracy.
But, once the Koch brothers organized Americans for Prosperity as an ongoing
political force to defend capitalism against misconceptions,54 another form of
52

See Gabriel, supra note 34.

53

Id.

54 See Kenneth P. Vogel, Koch Brothers Plan $125 Million Spending Spree, POLITICO
(May
9,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/koch-brothers-americans-forprosperity-2014-elections-106520.html. Defending capitalism against misconceptions is how
the group described its intentions in a memo about the upcoming campaign season. Id.
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independent spending began to emerge—one in which the independence of the
spending is real and there is little or no coordination between the spending and the
campaigns that are being supported. When other groups begin to set up their own
permanent structures that also mimic campaigns and political parties, the emphasis
in elections may begin to drift away from candidates to a parallel campaign among
interest groups.
Even if this section has convinced the reader that independent spending
represents a unique threat to American political life, the question remains as to what
can be done about it, since the Supreme Court has held that such spending is
constitutionally protected. I turn to that issue in the next section.
IV. THE PLAN TO STOP INDEPENDENT POLITICAL SPENDING BY ELIMINATING
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects spending by
individuals and groups to support the election of favored candidates.55 Despite the
arguments in the previous section that independent spending threatens American
democracy, the general thrust of these decisions is legally sound. Indeed, if free
speech does not guarantee that a citizen is free to rent a billboard at any time, with
the message, for example, “Don’t Vote for Clinton,” without having to get
permission from a government official or filing an official form, then it is hard to
imagine what free speech does mean. The Court is also correct to reason that a
citizen should be free to remain anonymous in independent electoral activity,56
especially given the current atmosphere, in which the identities of petition circulators
are posted online, thus exposing people to retaliation.57 Although scale matters, that
same constitutional protection must also be extended to groups organized to raise
funds to do the spending.
But if all this spending is constitutionally protected, how can there be a plan to
stop it? While even constitutional protections can be overcome by sufficiently
compelling government interests, the Court has, until now, rejected corruption as a
sufficient interest in the context of independent spending.58 Despite Professor
Lessig’s attempts at proposing a redefinition of corruption, and despite his
55

This is the key holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam), and
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19, 370-71 (2010).
56 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding the state
prohibition against the distribution of anonymous political literature as unconstitutional). In
McIntyre, the Court distinguished the disclosure requirements upheld in Buckley. Id. at 35357.
57 See Sean McMahon, Note, Deregulate But Still Disclose? Disclosure Requirements for
Ballot Question Advocacy After Citizens United v. FEC and Doe v. Reed, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
733, 734 (2013) (“Prop 8 Maps, a website that takes the publicly disclosed names and
addresses of financial supporters of California’s Proposition 8 against gay marriage and
overlays them on an accessible Google map, has been blamed for facilitating death threats and
other harassment against Proposition 8 backers.”). This is the sort of concern that led Justice
Alito to concur in Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010), arguing that even if disclosure
requirements in referendums are facially constitutional, individuals may bring as applied
challenges alleging that disclosure in a particular instance will expose them to retaliation. Id.
at 203 (Alito, J., concurring).
58

See supra Parts I and II.
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confidence in Justice Kagan’s powers of persuasion in moving the Court toward
recognition of new forms of corruption as justifying government regulation of
political spending, there is no indication that there will be a change in this case law
any time soon.59 Therefore, for now, any effort to regulate independent spending by
restricting it in amount or timing, and perhaps even in requiring non-corporate
transparency in financial sources,60 is likely to be found unconstitutional.
However, there is a way other than government regulation to eliminate
independent spending, or at least reduce its size and impact. That way is simply to
end campaign contribution limits. While calls for the end of contribution limits have
been made from time to time, those proposals have usually been grounded in First
Amendment considerations.61 But now, the threat from independent spending has
become so serious that the elimination of contribution limits needs to be
reconsidered as a means to protect democracy, whatever view one takes of the First
Amendment status of contributions limits.62 The rest of this section argues that
contribution limits, whatever their merits, are not worth their effect in creating and
sustaining independent political spending.
In considering the elimination of contribution limits, three questions must be
considered. First, would eliminating contribution limits actually stop independent
spending? Second, would the tradeoff be worth it—that is, even if eliminating
contribution limits would end independent spending, would the resulting regime of
unlimited direct campaign contributions be worse than the current campaign finance
system? Third, is the elimination of contribution limits politically feasible?
A. Eliminating Contribution Limits Will Stop Independent Spending
As to the first question, there are some anecdotal indications that eliminating
campaign contributions would end independent spending. After all, independent
spending as an organized phenomenon did not exist before contribution limits and
non-coordination requirements were introduced in the 1970s. In one large,
unintended experiment, California’s adoption of state and local contribution limits in
2001 does seem to have stimulated the growth of independent spending to its current
massive levels in that state.63
59

The per curiam decision in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490,
2491 (2012), striking down Montana's regulation of independent corporate political spending
and the decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1434-37 (2014), striking down
aggregate contribution limits, suggest that the Court has not moved any since Citizens United
was decided.
60 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United upheld disclosure requirements
in the context of corporate speech, but held open the possibility of as applied challenges when
the potential for retaliation that would chill speech can be shown. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
368-71.
61 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663, 664 (1997); Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the
First Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America's Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 27, 49 (2006) (“free speech purists call for the overturning of Buckley . . . .”).
62

There have been proposals to eliminate contribution limits along the lines set forth here,
as well. See Abraham, supra note 40.
63 Jim Miller, Independent Spending in California’s Statewide, Legislative Races the
Highest in Years, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 1, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
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Aside from empirical indications, reasonable speculation about what would
happen were contribution limits ended suggests why independent spending would
end or decline. First, without contribution limits, the legal structure of noncoordination would have to be rescinded. Non-coordination only exists as a way to
prevent contributions to campaigns that exceed contribution limits. Without that
justification, non-coordination is a pointless restriction on core political speech.64 So,
once contribution limits are eliminated, non-coordination will necessarily be
repealed or struck down.
In the absence of non-coordination requirements, voters could demand that
candidates rein in the excesses of their supporters, for example, the airing of
irresponsible attack ads. Unlike the current structure of legally enforced
irresponsibility, a candidate’s refusal or failure to assert control over all attack ads
launched for his or her benefit in a regime without non-coordination would lead to
the loss of electoral support. The inability or unwillingness of the candidate to
control supporters would be regarded as a failure of leadership.
Furthermore, once the advantage of irresponsibility was lost, candidates would
demand that contributions to independent Super PACs simply be contributed instead
to the candidate’s own campaign. The current trend to fund campaign activities
through independent spending referred to above is mostly just a way of avoiding
existing contribution limits. Without those limits, the complex structure currently
evolving would be unnecessary. Thus, independent groups, like Americans for
Prosperity, would quickly be forced to contribute directly to campaigns rather than
undertake independent activities65 for fear of alienating the very candidates they
purport to support. Eventually, candidates would just obtain the original
contributions themselves and would not need independent groups at all.
Even the problem of dark money would disappear without campaign contribution
limits. Without non-coordination requirements, the media and voters could ask
candidates to fully identify financial sources when they receive campaign
contributions from groups. Of course, a candidate could make a principled First
Amendment argument that anonymity should be respected, but the voters might not
be impressed by that position. Even if the candidate were to return dark money
contributions, any resulting independent spending of that money would still be
regarded as the candidate’s responsibility.
While there cannot be certainty that eliminating contribution limits will diminish
independent spending, a natural experiment that Pennsylvania conducted during the
2015 campaign season may help determine whether there would be such an effect.
Because of retirement, resignation under fire, and criminal conviction, Pennsylvania,
government/election/article2600258.html#storylink=cpy (“Such spending has been a fixture
of California races since 2001, following voters’ approval of contribution limits for
candidates. The independent groups can accept unlimited amounts from deep-pocketed donors
but cannot legally coordinate with the campaigns of candidates they support.”).
64 See Justin B. Uhlemann, Comment, Constitutional Law: The Not So Narrow Tailoring
of State Limits on Campaign Contributions, 53 FLA. L. REV. 183, 185 (2001) (stating that the
Buckley Court regarded contribution limits as infringing on fundamental right of political
association and only upheld them under exacting scrutiny).
65 Current restrictions on Super PACs' contributions to campaigns would also be relaxed
or eliminated once contribution limits are ended. Without contribution limits, they also would
serve no purpose.
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which holds partisan judicial elections, elected three justices to its seven-member
Supreme Court.66 That large number means that partisan and ideological control of
the court is at stake. Perhaps because Pennsylvania does not have contribution limits
in judicial elections, independent spending has not been an issue in previous judicial
campaigns. But, such an extraordinary potential prize raised fears that organized
interests—business, union, environmental—might flood the airwaves with judicial
attack ads during this particular judicial election.
In an attempt to forestall this possibility in the general election, I wrote an op-ed
the day of the primary election that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer and online,
calling on the six winners to forego any independent spending on their behalf by
formally asking their supporters to make direct campaign contributions instead.67 So
far, this effort has not worked, as the candidates have stated that they do not intend
to interfere with how people wish to spend their money. But this evasion of
responsibility by the judicial candidates may not last once the voters begin to pay
attention to the matter in the fall. In any event, even having to respond demonstrates
that the absence of contribution limits can have an effect on independent spending.
I doubt that the speculations above will be particularly controversial. When I put
the question of the effect of eliminating contribution limits to noted campaign
finance expert Joseph Fishkin, at the Association of American Law Schools program
on campaign finance reform in January 2015,68 he did not deny that such a change
would transfer independent spending to campaign spending.69 In fact, Professor
Fishkin was skeptical of proposals to eliminate contribution limits combined with
disclosure requirements, because, he said, it would simply transfer the current
excesses of independent fundraising and spending—its responsiveness to only a few
large donors—to candidates and political parties.70 In contrast, campaigns now are at
least partly still volunteer affairs and politically responsive, which would end once
candidates became, in effect, Super PACs. Professor Fishkin did not doubt that
eliminating contribution limits would transform independent spending into campaign
spending, which raises the second question regarding whether there would be any
gain from eliminating contribution limits.71

66 See Chris Potter, Three Open Seats on PA Supreme Court Make for Pivotal Races, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (May 3, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politicsstate/2015/05/03/Three-open-seats-on-PA-Supreme-Court-make-for-pivotalraces/stories/201505310002; see also Eric Holmberg, What You Need to Know About the PA
Supreme Court Race, PUBLICSOURCE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2015), http://publicsource.org/from-thesource/what-you-need-know-about-pa-supreme-court-race#.Vj-zirSTr8E.
67 See Bruce Ledewitz, Court Candidates, Pledge to Limit Campaign Donations, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 18, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/thinktank/Courtcandidates-pledge-to-limit-campaign-donations.html.
68 Professor Joseph Fishkin, Citizens Invited: Scholars and Professors in the Campaign
Finance Wars, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS. (Jan. 4, 2015), https://soundcloud.com/aals-2/hottopic-bridge-citizens-invited/s-pMWR3.
69

Id. My question was put at around 4:34 PM and Professor Fishkin responds around
thirty-six minutes into the program.
70

Id.

71

Id.
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B. Eliminating Contribution Limits Will Prevent Campaign Corruption by Allowing
Candidates to Once Again Control the Campaign
Assuming that eliminating contribution limits were to greatly restrict independent
spending, would such a change just corrupt candidates as much, or even more, than
the current system? One way to think about answering this question is to consider
whether independent spending is more harmful to democracy than spending by
candidates. Of course, the prior section attempted to show that it is. If that is the
case, then the tradeoff of substituting campaign contributions for independent
spending would be worth it even if nothing else were to change. In a world without
contribution limits, and without a ban on coordination, candidates and political
parties would receive and spend most of the money raised and spent on political
campaigns. This would result in more politically responsible campaigns, with fewer
blatantly unfair attack ads, and would focus voter attention away from the interests
favored by economically powerful interest groups and toward issues that candidates
determined should be the focus of the campaign.
But the benefits of ending contribution limits might go beyond just shifting the
same amount of money from independent spending to direct campaign contributions.
In a world without contribution limits, candidates and voters would likely insist that
money go to the candidates themselves, who would then be responsible for how the
money was spent. In this world, the egos of rich individuals, who now receive
attention and satisfaction from changing the course of a campaign through their
independent activities, would be relegated to mere contributors among many other
contributors. Perhaps in this new world, there would be less incentive to contribute
at all. It is possible, then, that less money, or at least fewer large donations, would be
spent on campaigns overall after contribution limits were eliminated.
What, then, about the effect on candidates that Professor Fishkin predicts? Would
this not be worse than the current system? The answer to that question is plainly, no.
The new system would be an improvement. For one thing, this fear of the effect of
campaign contributions on candidates ignores the fact that candidates raise money
now. Even candidates who benefit the most from independent spending cannot
entirely rely on it. Candidates are already money machines even without taking into
account the new phenomenon of non-declared candidates raising Super PAC
money—without contribution limits—and only then formally declaring.72
In addition, candidates are inefficient money machines. Part of the reason that
candidates spend so much time on fundraising is contribution limits.73 Super PACs
do not have to constantly fundraise because they can accept large contributions. So,
if a candidate is willing to absorb the political heat from receiving a couple of
million dollar checks that will fund an entire campaign, they should be permitted to
do so. Undoubtedly, in response, the opponents of such candidates will then pledge
to limit contributions to a relatively small amount. The voters can then choose which
approach they prefer.

72

This was the tactic utilized by Jeb Bush in the spring of 2015. See Andrew Prokop, Jeb
Bush is Stretching the Limits of Campaign Finance Law, VOX (Apr. 6, 2015, 3:40 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/6/8354331/jeb-bush-fundraising.
73 See Vincent Blasi, Spending Limits and the Squandering of Candidates' Time, 6 J.L. &
POL'Y 123, 124 (1997).
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In addition, eliminating contribution limits would eliminate the noxious role of
the bundler. These are individuals who get around contribution limits by bringing a
bunch of individual contributions to a candidate in one fell swoop, thus skirting even
existing campaign finance regulations.74 At least the influence of these individuals
would be lessened in the world of unrestricted contributions.
There are other potential advantages from the elimination of contribution limits.
In terms of grass roots campaigns, the law of contribution limits is part of the
complexity of election law that helps keep outsiders from running. If people could
give any amount of money, record-keeping requirements could be simplified. In
addition, while independent spending can be uniquely valuable to a candidate—for
the reasons explained above—all contributions are of the same value per dollar
contributed. So, candidates will be less obligated to special interests if support takes
the form of contributions rather than independent spending. It may even be that
opposing interests will be encouraged to make contributions to the same candidates,
thus offsetting the influence of one side in a controversy. This is harder to do when
independent spending takes place.
Granted, Americans assume that personal solicitation of contributions by a
candidate creates a unique context for influence on that candidate. It was in part just
such a concern that led the Supreme Court to permit restrictions on personal
solicitations by judicial candidates even when independent spending on behalf of
judicial candidates was not restricted in any way.75 But whatever validity there may
be in this intuition with regard to the problem of quid pro quo corruption—or, in the
case of a judge, the loss of faith in an impartial judiciary—there is no reason to
assume that office holders are generally more responsive to the issue orientation of
contributors to them than they are to independent spending on their behalf.
Furthermore, responsiveness by a non-judicial office holder to the issue concerns
of contributors is quite different from the fear that judges will be influenced by
contributions in their decision-making. For example, if a candidate for legislative
office is elected with the monetary and electoral support of pro-life or pro-choice
voters, it is not any form of democratic deformation for that office holder to respond
to the concerns of those voters and contributors when voting on abortion related
issues. Indeed, that is exactly what we expect an office holder to do. It is only in the
case of a judge that we would regard any form of responsiveness in decision-making
to a contributor to be threatening to the value of the rule of law. Even in the case of a
judge, however, there is reason to doubt that personal solicitation is more threatening
than independent spending. The reader should remember that in the only case in
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See Michael Gentithes, An Aggregated Threat: Campaign Contribution "Bundling" and
the Future of Reform, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2012). "The rapidly-growing
modern practice of campaign finance 'bundling' allows a single powerful donor to stockpile
innumerable individual contributions and deliver them in one package to a candidate for use
entirely at that candidate's discretion. Often, such bundled contributions are a farcical front for
the donor's personal effort to fund a candidate well beyond existing contribution ceilings,
earning the bundler special notoriety and inside access during an ongoing campaign." Id.
75 See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015). The failure of the
government to attempt to limit independent spending on behalf of judicial candidates was one
ground for Justice Scalia’s dissent in the case. See id. at 1679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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which political activity led the Supreme Court to order recusal, the activity was not
campaign contributions but independent spending.76
C. Eliminating Contribution Limits is a Feasible and Constitutional Solution
The political reason that contribution limits could so easily be abolished is that
many Republicans and conservatives are already of the view that contribution limits
at least threaten, if not violate, First Amendment values. This was the point of the
Chief Justice Burger's partial dissent in Buckley.77 For this reason, any general
attempt to eliminate contribution limits, whether at a state or national level, would
receive overwhelming Republican support.78 This leaves Democrats and liberals,
many of whom, like Professor Lessig, do not believe that contribution limits violate
the First Amendment. So, contribution limits would be repealed tomorrow if even a
portion of this latter group became convinced that there were reasons other than the
First Amendment for repeal of contribution limits.
The purpose of this Article is, in large part, to change the view of eliminating
contribution limits by some of those in the liberal camp. Until now, any argument
about contribution limits has centered around the meaning of free speech. I have
purposely avoided such constitutional considerations here. My goal is to raise the
issue of independent political spending as a serious problem aside from general
considerations of the influence of money in politics. Then, hopefully, people will
consider the elimination of contribution limits not just as a constitutional issue, but
also as a way of curbing the power of independent spending.
We are not helpless to do something while the Koch brothers on the right and all
sorts of individuals and groups on the left create shadow campaigns and parallel
campaigns that engage in harmful activities and eclipse genuine democracy. We can
break the current deadlock around this problem. In fact, if Professor Lessig endorsed
the change, given his influence among Americans who are worried about the
political influence of money, contribution limits would very likely be quickly
eliminated.
However, treating contribution limits and independent spending as separate from
all other efforts of campaign finance reform is not a realistic way of framing the
issue. Professor Lessig has been promoting a much larger effort toward campaign
finance reconceptualization. Before asking him and his supporters to join an effort to
eliminate contribution limits, the effect of such a repeal on that larger project must
be addressed. At first glance, one would think that repeal of contribution limits
would have a negative effect on Professor Lessig's larger effort. In the next section, I
hope to show, instead, that eliminating contribution limits is actually a necessary
first step toward enacting any more general campaign finance reform.
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See Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873, 879-90 (2009).
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See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241-46 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
78 This is not pure speculation. Actual attempts to eliminate contribution limits at the state
level have generated patterns of support and opposition very much along party lines. See, for
example, the experience in West Virginia, Joel Ebert, Bill to Remove Political Contribution
Limits Sent to Subcommittee, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://www.charlestondailymail.com/article/20150225/DM01/150229574.
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V. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ELIMINATING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS TO PROFESSOR
LESSIG’S REFORM PLAN
Independent spending is a major impediment to the enactment of Professor
Lessig’s campaign finance reform program. To see this, consider Professor Lessig’s
major proposal: public financing of elections, either by a voucher system or by direct
public financing, to reduce the influence of private money in political affairs, in
favor of what he calls dependence on the people.79
Independent spending is already reducing the impact of one form of public
financing currently in place—public financing of the election campaign for
President.80 Imagine a Republican candidate for President who proposed, after the
party nominating convention, that both major party candidates for President forswear
private campaign contributions in favor of public financing in the general election.
This would be a reasonable proposal since each candidate would have the same
amount of money to spend81—in 2012, each major party general election candidate
for President was eligible to receive $91.2 million in public funds82—and for all the
reasons Professor Lessig has highlighted in his writings and speaking, the public
would be in favor of this proposal.
Yet, as things now stand, no Democratic candidate for President could
responsibly agree to this proposal. With the independent spending structures now in
place, the Democratic Party presidential candidate would be overwhelmed by
independently funded attack ads and non-coordination rules would prevent the
Republican candidate from stopping these independent efforts, even if the will to do
so were present. While groups would raise independent money on behalf of the
Democratic nominee as well, this would not change the negative calculation.
Democrats have never been able to match independent spending by Republican Party
supporters. Regardless, no presidential candidate would hand over the future of her
campaign to outsiders.
At the moment, the First Amendment would prevent any restriction on the
amount of money independently raised and spent on behalf of the Republican
candidate in my scenario. Even if this constitutional interpretation were to change
79

See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 265-72

80 In 2008, Democrat Barack Obama was the first major party candidate to reject public
financing for the general election. Independent spending is one of the factors that has led
presidential candidates to abandon the public financing system. See Tarini Parti, Will 2012 Be
the End of the Presidential Public Financing System?, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/08/the-end-of-presidential-public-financing.
According to the Congressional Research Service, “No major candidate accepted public funds
in 2012.” R. Sam Garrett, Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential
Campaigns, CONG. RES. SERV. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41604.pdf.
81 See Public Funding of Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Apr. 2015),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml#Expenditure_Limits. Public financing
requires that the candidate forswear additional fundraising and spending during the general
election: “A major party nominee who has accepted public funding for the general election
may not accept any contributions to further his election.” Id. Campaign spending limits apply
to acceptance of matching public funds during the primary campaign. Id.
82 Quick
Answers to Public Funding Questions, FED. ELECTION
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_public_funding.shtml#howmuchmoneydotheyget
visited Jan. 17, 2016). The amounts are adjusted for cost of living.
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that would just cause the negative attack ads to become negative issue ads. The
Democratic nominee would have to respond to ads such as “The Iranian deal will
give Iran the bomb” or “Obamacare has been a failure.” No conceivable
interpretation of the First Amendment could prevent negative discussion of the
issues during an election campaign. So, no Democratic nominee for President could
agree to public financing. Thus, independent spending has already been an important
factor in the nonuse of public funding by presidential candidates.
Similar scenarios can be imagined in local government campaigns. Today, local
governments, under the influence of Professor Lessig’s reform program, are
considering public election funding.83 But, as independent groups discover the power
of independent spending at the local level, these public funding efforts may also be
overwhelmed and thus abandoned. One can easily imagine restaurant and retail
groups running independent attack ads against incumbent city council members in
every city in which the minimum wage has been raised. Under most public financing
rules, these incumbents would not be able to raise concomitant amounts of money to
respond to such attacks.
Imagine now a world without contribution limits. In this world, independent
spending has gradually dried up as candidates and political parties have insisted that
they control the planning and spending in campaigns. The abolition of noncoordination restrictions has also enabled candidates to discourage spending by
outside groups. Super PACs have disappeared as candidates have developed their
own capacities to solicit large scale contributions. Voters have gotten used to
campaigns totally controlled by candidates.
In this world, an offer by one presidential candidate to the other that they both
accept public financing could at least be considered. It would not be political suicide
to accept such an offer. This is one way that eliminating contribution limits can serve
the accomplishment of Professor Lessig’s overall goals. Yes, in the short run, ending
contribution limits just further emphasizes private fundraising by candidates. But as
the above thought experiment shows, eventually, the end of contribution limits could
serve to strengthen the potential for public financing of elections.
But all this, of course, is speculation. However, there is one way that ending
contribution limits immediately serves Professor Lessig’s goals by breaking the
partisan logjam on political finance reform.
Many conservatives reject Professor Lessig’s basic analysis of the role of money
in American political life. For them, given the size of the United States economy,
relatively little is spent on politics, perhaps not enough.84 In addition, many
conservatives see the First Amendment as strongly supportive of campaign finance
that is free of government regulation. For someone who shares Professor Lessig’s
commitments, there is not very much common ground with such conservatives
around these questions. Yet, Professor Lessig has also favored nonpartisan

83

Lessig adverted to these efforts in his presentation during the Symposium. See Lessig,
supra note 18.
84 See Peter Roff, There's Not Enough Money in Political Campaigns, U.S. NEWS REPS.
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2010/11/16/theres-notenough-money-in-political-campaigns.
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approaches to campaign finance reform and has emphasized the need to find elusive
common ground.85
The goal of eliminating contribution limits can serve as just the kind of joint first
step that Professor Lessig has advocated. Probably both conservatives and liberals
share the commitment that political campaigns are best run by candidates rather than
by independent groups, as long as the right of independent groups to participate is
respected. While conservatives and liberals would not agree on any coercive
regulations to discourage independent spending, they might be able to agree on a
non-coercive approach, such as ending contribution limits as a way to curb
independent spending. If so, ending contribution limits could be the beginning of a
renewed nonpartisan dialogue about money and politics.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, Professor Lawrence Lessig has convinced millions of
Americans of the need for campaign finance reform through his persuasive analysis
of the influence of money in American elections and policy-making. If there is a
chance that these matters will be addressed, it is largely because of his efforts.
Nevertheless, the failure of Professor Lessig to address independent political
spending as a separate issue has hindered his appreciation of the unique harm that
independent spending poses to democratic life. Independent spending must be
curbed now, before its corrosive effects undermine American democracy beyond
repair. Independent spending is worse than the problem of money in politics
generally.
Fortunately, independent spending can be curbed without constitutional
amendment, constitutional convention, or shifting First Amendment analysis.
Independent political spending is the creation of campaign contribution limits and
can be curtailed by simply eliminating those restrictions.
The resulting world of unlimited, large contributions by a small number of
donors giving directly to candidates may seem very far away from the concerns and
hopes of Professor Lessig. That impression is misleading. Direct contributions to
candidates are much more subject to democratic discipline and filtering than is
independent spending. Because of that, even a dollar-for-dollar shift from
independent spending to campaign contribution would reduce the influence of
money in politics. In addition, the plaything of a few wealthy individuals that
independent spending has made of American politics may be lessened when those
same individuals contribute money rather than run their own, parallel campaigns.
Finally, restricting independent spending is one way to reach the ultimate goal of
robust public financing. It will be far easier to move to public financing in a context
in which candidates and campaign contributions represent the workings of money in
our system, as opposed to our current context of independent groups and spending,
which undermines any hope of a public financing system. Though Professor Lessig
may not yet agree, the elimination of contribution limits should be high on his
agenda of campaign finance reform.

85 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 335 (“[T]here is critical work to be done now to build
understanding across the insane political divide that defines politics in America today.”).
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